During his active duty career in the U.S. Navy, Francesco “Paco” Chierici flew A-6E Intruders and F-14A Tomcats, deployed to conflict zones from Somalia to Iraq and was stationed aboard carriers including the USS Ranger, Nimitz and Kitty Hawk. Throughout his military career, Paco accumulated 3,000 tactical hours, 400 carrier landings, a Southwest Asia Service Medal with Bronze Star, and three Strike/Flight Air Medals. Unable to give up dogfighting, he flew the F-5 Tiger II for a further ten years as a Bandit.
Paco is now a pilot for a major U.S. airline.
When the aircraft arrived from London earlier that morning, the previous flight crew had reported a frozen door seal and abnormal noises coming from the right aft service door. They requested a full inspection of the door. The inspection was carried out by a ground engineer who then performed a pressurization leak check. In order to carry out this check without requiring the aircraft's engines, the pressurization system was set to "manual". However, the engineer failed to reset it to "auto" on completion of the test.
After the aircraft was returned into service, the flight crew overlooked the pressurisation system state on three separate occasions: during the pre-flight procedure, the after-start check, and the after take-off check. During these checks, no one in the flight crew noticed the incorrect setting. The aircraft took off at 9:07 with the pressurization system still set to "manual", and the aft outflow valve partially open.
As the aircraft climbed, the pressure inside the cabin gradually decreased. As it passed through an altitude of 12,040 feet (3,670 m), the cabin altitude warning horn sounded. The warning should have prompted the crew to stop climbing, but it was misidentified by the crew as a take-off configuration warning, which signals that the aircraft is not ready for take-off, and can only sound on the ground.
In the next few minutes, several warning lights on the overhead panel in the cockpit illuminated. One or both of the equipment cooling warning lights came on to indicate low airflow through the cooling fans (a result of the decreased air density), accompanied by the master caution light. The passenger oxygen light illuminated when, at an altitude of approximately 18,000 feet (5,500 m), the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin automatically deployed.
Shortly after the cabin altitude warning sounded, the captain radioed the Helios operations centre and reported "the take-off configuration warning on" and "cooling equipment normal and alternate off line". He then spoke to the ground engineer and repeatedly stated that the "cooling ventilation fan lights were off". The engineer (the one who had conducted the pressurization leak check) asked "Can you confirm that the pressurization panel is set to AUTO?" However, the captain, already experiencing the onset of hypoxia's initial symptoms, disregarded the question and instead asked in reply, "Where are my equipment cooling circuit breakers?". This was the last communication with the aircraft.
The aircraft continued to climb until it leveled off at FL340, approximately 34,000 feet (10,000 m). Between 09:30 and 09:40, Nicosia ATC repeatedly attempted to contact the aircraft, without success. At 09:37, the aircraft passed from Cyprus Flight Information Region (FIR) into Athens FIR, without making contact with Athens ATC. Nineteen attempts to contact the aircraft between 10:12 and 10:50 also met with no response, and at 10:40 the aircraft entered the holding pattern for Athens Airport, at the KEA VHF omnidirectional range, still at FL340. It remained in the holding pattern, under control of the auto-pilot, for the next 70 minutes.
Two F-16 fighter aircraft from the Hellenic Air Force 111th Combat Wing were scrambled from Nea Anchialos Air Base to establish visual contact. They intercepted the passenger jet at 11:24 and observed that the first officer was slumped motionless at the controls and the captain's seat was empty. They also reported that oxygen masks were dangling in the passenger cabin.
At 11:49, flight attendant Andreas Prodromou entered the cockpit and sat down in the captain's seat, having remained conscious by using a portable oxygen supply. Prodromou held a UK Commercial Pilot Licence, but was not qualified to fly the Boeing 737. Crash investigators concluded that Prodromou's experience was insufficient for him to be able to gain control of the aircraft under the circumstances. Prodromou waved at the F16s very briefly, but almost as soon as he entered the cockpit, the left engine flamed out due to fuel exhaustion and the plane left the holding pattern and started to descend. Ten minutes after the loss of power from the left engine, the right engine also flamed out, and just before 12:04 the aircraft crashed into hills near Grammatiko, 40 km (25 mi; 22 nmi) from Athens, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board.
Anna Rice fell in love with aviation as a child, as she accompanied her flight attendant mother on trips to Europe. She attended Metro State College of Denver (now Metropolitan State University of Denver), majoring in Aviation, and was selected as an intern at American Airlines.
After graduation, she became a CFI and then a pilot for a small airline, and was on track to become a pilot with American Airlines when the attacks of September 11th crippled the U.S. airline industry. She continued to work as a CFI until another airline job became available.
THEN another career hurdle appeared, the airline pilot age limit raising from 60 to 65. That caused total stagnation in upward movement at her airline, and she was furloughed.
When she had children, she saw the furlough as a blessing, as she was able to stay home to raise them, and she bypassed her recall until the children were older.
She is now back at her airline as a B737 First Officer.
The introduction of the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) in the early 1990s marks another stage in the evolution of error management. Under
AQP, a voluntary program, the FAA allows air carriers to develop training programs specific to their individual needs and operations. A condition for
AQP authorization is the requirement to have a CRM program that is integrated into technical training.
To accomplish this objective, air carriers began to “proceduralize” CRM by incorporating desired behaviors into operational procedures and checklists.
Although AQP is a voluntary program, the FAA Flight Standards Service encourages air carriers to participate. AQP provides for enhanced curriculum development and a data-driven approach to quality assurance along with the flexibility to target critical tasks during aircrew training. The AQP methodology directly supports the FAA’s goals for safety enhancement. The primary goal of AQP is to achieve the highest possible standard of individual and crew performance. In order to achieve this goal, AQP seeks to reduce the probability of crew-related errors by aligning training and evaluation requirements more closely with the known causes of human error. For example:
a. Crew Performance. Most accidents are attributed to crew error. Traditional training programs focus on individual training and evaluation. Under AQP, the focus is on crew and individual performance in both training and evaluation.
b. CRM. Most accidents are caused by errors of judgment, communication, and crew coordination. Traditional training programs focus primarily on flying skills and systems knowledge. Under AQP, competence in flying skills and systems knowledge are integrated with CRM skills in training and evaluation throughout the curriculum.
c. Scenario-Based Training and Evaluation. Most accidents are caused by a chain of errors that build up over the course of a flight and which, if undetected or unresolved, result in a final, fatal error. Traditional training programs, with their maneuver-based training and evaluation, artificially segment simulation events in such a way as to prevent the realistic buildup of the error chain. Under AQP, both training and evaluation are scenario-based, simulating more closely the actual flight conditions known to cause most fatal carrier accidents.
d. Additional Benefits. Added benefits that are expected for individual applicants will vary, but may include:
(1) The ability to modify training curricula, media, and intervals.
(2) Crew evaluation as well as individual assessment.
(3) Improved standardization across fleets and flight personnel.
(4) Shift from programmed hours to proficiency-based training.
(5) Access to innovative training ideas and research.
(6) Opportunity to achieve more efficient training.
Under Chairman Sumwalt’s leadership, the agency’s ranking in the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government has advanced 33 percent to the agency’s current position of Number 6 of 29 small federal agencies. He is a fierce advocate for improving safety in all modes of transportation, including teen driver safety, impaired driving, distractions in transportation, and several aviation and rail safety initiatives.
Before joining the NTSB, Chairman Sumwalt was a pilot for 32 years, including 24 years with Piedmont Airlines and US Airways. He accumulated over 14,000 flight hours. During his tenure at US Airways, he worked on special assignment to the flight safety department and served on the airline’s Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) monitoring team.
Following his airline career, Chairman Sumwalt managed the corporate aviation department for a Fortune 500 energy company.
In other notable accomplishments, he chaired the Air Line Pilots Association’s Human Factors and Training Group and co-founded the association’s critical incident response program. He also spent eight years as a consultant to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and has written extensively on aviation safety matters. He has co-authored a book on aircraft accidents and has published more than 100 articles on transportation safety and aircraft accident investigation.
Chairman Sumwalt earned an undergraduate degree from the University of South Carolina and a Master of Aeronautical Science (with Distinction) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, with concentrations in aviation/aerospace safety systems and human factors aviation systems. In recognition of his accomplishments, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Science degree from the University of South Carolina, and an honorary doctorate from Embry-Riddle. He is an inductee into the South Carolina Aviation Hall of Fame.
In RFT 086 we discussed Stabilized Approaches. According to AINOnline fully 96 percent of all airline flights conclude with stabilized approaches. Of the 4 percent that are not stabilized, virtually NONE of them (3%) result in a go-around!
FAA recommends</a> that approach stabilization start as far out as possible. Simply stated, a stable approach is a 3-degree glide path, executed on-speed and fully configured for landing. It's easy to calculate a 3-degree glide path - simply take half your groundspeed and multiply it by 10 to get the vertical speed to maintain the 3 degrees.
Since the go-around is not performed nearly as often as a normal landing, it is essential that the crew review the procedures involved in a go-around when they brief the approach.
From LinkedIn:
Chris “Elroy” Stricklin is an award-winning leadership author, a highly sought after motivational keynote speaker and a Combat-Proven Senior Military leader retiring after 23 years which culminated with CEO-Level leadership of a 7,000-person strong, $7B worldwide organization. During this time, he was responsible for 11,383 personnel, $323M Payroll, $160M Contracts, Creation of 1,891 jobs and local economic impact of $566M.
His style combines the skills acquired as a combat-proven leader, mentor, author, speaker and coach integrating the fields of dynamic Leadership, followership, negotiations, positive change, public relations, public speaking and complex organizational change as a business strategist.
Unique experience as a U.S.A.F. Thunderbird Solo coupled with CEO-Level duties and Pentagon-level strategic management of critical Air Force resources valued at $840B, multiple N.A.T.O. assignments, White House and DARPA fellowships, and command-experience in the United States Air Force allow his unique synthesis of speaking, following, leading, management, negotiations, continuous improvement and positive change. His acclaimed keynote reveals the secret to Teamwork…The Thunderbird Way, an insight into the success principles and training methods used by The Air Force Thunderbirds to ensure precision and success each season.
A combat-decorated Fighter Pilot, Chris is also a Certified Manager with degrees in Economics, Financial Planning, Management, Real Estate, Strategic Studies and Operational Art and Science. He authored a negotiation primer subsequently published and adopted as required Air Force Pentagon new action officer orientation. He and his wife, Terri, have 4 children.
Chris's website has more information.
What began as one dog on an airplane several years ago has evolved into a team of over 100 volunteers who fly or drive animals from danger to safety. Founded in 2009 by pilots and friends Brad Childs and Jonathan Plesset, the organization become a recognized 501c(3) entity in 2012. Since then our teams have conducted a wide range of missions including hoarding cases, saving animals from dog fighting rings and natural disasters, and helping overcrowded shelters. We now have the capability to respond to a huge variety of rescue needs both near and far. During the devastating hurricanes in 2017, PAART made its first international journey, heading to the storm-ravaged island of Tortola in the British Virgin Islands to rescue not only 42 animals, but two rescuers who had found themselves stranded on the island for weeks. Our reach stretches from Texas to Florida and all the way up the East Coast to Massachusetts. We have conducted rescue missions as far inland as the Mississippi River. While Pittsburgh is in our name, it actually makes up less than 10% of the area we cover.
Our rescue partners are many, ranging in size from large organizations like The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), and North Shore Animal League America, as well as small shelters in remote areas of West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia and beyond. One of our newer partners is St. Hubert’s Animal Welfare Center in Madison, New Jersey. With an increasing population disparity in the northern states, St. Hubert’s serves as a hub for animals heading into New England where rescue dogs are scarce but people still want to have the fulfilling opportunity to rescue a beautiful, healthy animal who otherwise would have met a devastating fate.
mmonly known as “takeoff safety s
The second segment requirement is often the most difficult one to meet. Segment two begins when the gear is up and locked and the speed is V2. This segment has the steepest climb gradient: 2.4 percent. This equates to a ballpark figure of around 300 feet per minute, and for a heavy airplane on a hot day with a failed engine, this can be a challenge. Often, when the airlines announce that a flight is weight-limited on hot summer days, this is the reason (the gate agent doesn’t know this kind of detail, and nor does she care; she just knows some people aren’t going).
The magic computers we use for computing performance data figure all this out, saving us the trouble of using charts and graphs. All we know is that we can either carry the planned load or we can’t.
Second segment climb ends at 400 feet, so it could take up to a minute or more to fly this segment. Think of all the obstacles that might be in the departure path in the course of 60 seconds or more.
Third segment climb begins at 400 feet, and here the rules can vary. The climb gradient is now half of what it was before: 1.2 percent. However, we are also required to accelerate to a speed called VFS (final segment climb speed). In graphs and publications, the third segment of the climb is often depicted as being a flat line for the acceleration. In many turboprops, that’s exactly the way it’s flown. The airplane is leveled off (and the pilot is using a very tired leg to overcome the increasing yaw tendency via the rudder) and accelerated before the final climb begins.
In jets, however, there is generally enough power in the remaining engine to avoid a level-off. If the airplane can continue to accelerate during the third segment, it may continue to climb, so long as it can do so without a decrease in speed or performance. In fact, during the climb it must continue to meet the climb gradient while accelerating to VFS.
Third segment climb ends upon reaching VFS.
The fourth and “final segment” begins upon reaching VFS and completing the climb configuration process. It is now permissible (and maybe necessary) to reduce thrust to a Maximum Continuous setting. The climb gradient is again 1.2 percent, and VFS must be maintained to 1,500 feet above field elevation.
ore.
Third segment climb begins at 400 feet, and here the rules can vary. The climb gradient is now half of what it was before: 1.2 percent. However, we are also required to accelerate to a speed called VFS (final segment climb speed). In graphs and publications, the third segment of the climb is often depicted as being a flat line for the acceleration. In many turboprops, that’s exactly the way it’s flown. The airplane is leveled off (and the pilot is using a very tired leg to overcome the increasing yaw tendency via the rudder) and accelerated before the final climb begins.
In jets, however, there is generally enough power in the remaining engine to avoid a level-off. If the airplane can continue to accelerate during the third segment, it may continue to climb, so long as it can do so without a decrease in speed or performance. In fact, during the climb it must continue to meet the climb gradient while accelerating to VFS.
Third segment climb ends upon reaching VFS.
The fourth and “final segment” begins upon reaching VFS and completing the climb configuration process. It is now permissible (and maybe necessary) to reduce thrust to a Maximum Continuous setting. The climb gradient is again 1.2 percent, and VFS must be maintained to 1,500 feet above field elevation.
From d,” but in technical terms, the speed for best climb gradient.
The second segment requirement is often the most difficult one to meet. Segment two begins when the gear is up and locked and the speed is V2. This segment has the steepest climb gradient: 2.4 percent. This equates to a ballpark figure of around 300 feet per minute, and for a heavy airplane on a hot day with a failed engine, this can be a challenge. Often, when the airlines announce that a flight is weight-limited on hot summer days, this is the reason (the gate agent doesn’t know this kind of detail, and nor does she care; she just knows some people aren’t going).
The magic computers we use for computing performance data figure all this out, saving us the trouble of using charts and graphs. All we know is that we can either carry the planned load or we can’t.
Second segment climb ends at 400 feet, so it could take up to a minute or more to fly this segment. Think of all the obstacles that might be in the departure path in the course of 60 seconds or more.
Third segment climb begins at 400 feet, and here the rules can vary. The climb gradient is now half of what it was before: 1.2 percent. However, we are also required to accelerate to a speed called VFS (final segment climb speed). In graphs and publications, the third segment of the climb is often depicted as being a flat line for the acceleration. In many turboprops, that’s exactly the way it’s flown. The airplane is leveled off (and the pilot is using a very tired leg to overcome the increasing yaw tendency via the rudder) and accelerated before the final climb begins.
In jets, however, there is generally enough power in the remaining engine to avoid a level-off. If the airplane can continue to accelerate during the third segment, it may continue to climb, so long as it can do so without a decrease in speed or performance. In fact, during the climb it must continue to meet the climb gradient while accelerating to VFS.
Third segment climb ends upon reaching VFS.
The fourth and “final segment” begins upon reaching VFS and completing the climb configuration process. It is now permissible (and maybe necessary) to reduce thrust to a Maximum Continuous setting. The climb gradient is again 1.2 percent, and VFS must be maintained to 1,500 feet above field elevation.
This week we're having a flashback to hear Brigadier General Steve Ritchie tell his story. Steve shot down five enemy aircraft in Vietnam, making him the first (and only) Air Force pilot ace of the war. Most striking is his description of almost getting a sixth MiG, and the iron discipline involved.
Before you listen to Steve Ritchie's interview, please read this passage from Hamfist Over Hanoi, based on a true story:
“Now before I tell you what I consider the most important quality of a fighter pilot, and this goes for you WSOs also, I'm going to tell you a story.”
“During Operation Rolling Thunder, an F-105 flight lead was in an extended engagement with a MiG. He was performing repeated high-speed yoyos, gaining on the MiG with each yoyo. One more yoyo and he would be in a firing position.”
The Colonel paused and looked around the room. We were all transfixed in rapt attention.
“Just as he was about to get a firing solution, his wingman called Bingo.”
Bingo meant that the fuel had reached the predetermined quantity where the flight must Return To Base.
“What do you think Lead did?”
Colonel West made eye contact with each of us. I was hoping he wasn't expecting any of us to answer.
“Lead did what he was supposed to do,” he continued, “he disengaged by doing a quarter roll and zoom, and he RTB'd. And I'll tell you why he did it. He did it because he had flight discipline. And he had trust. He trusted that his wingman wouldn't call Bingo unless he was really at Bingo fuel. And he, the Flight Lead, had established that Bingo. He gave up his MiG because he had discipline. If he had taken one more slice, done one more yoyo, he could have had that MiG. But he would have put his wingman in jeopardy. He did the right thing. He had discipline.”
“I expect, I demand, that all my pilots exhibit discipline. I don't expect anyone to be perfect in his flying. You're going to make mistakes, and you're going to learn from your mistakes. But I do expect everyone to have perfect discipline. If anyone in the flight calls Bingo, you RTB, whether you've accomplished your training or not. If anyone calls Knock It Off, you discontinue the maneuver. And if you find yourself out of control below 10,000 feet, you eject.”
“Does anyone have any questions?”
Nobody uttered a word.
From Skybrary:
SOP is a Standard Operating Procedure.
Many industries use SOP’s as a common way of ensuring tasks or operations are completed correctly, however SOP’s are essential in aviation.
They ensure that aircraft are flown correctly in accordance with the manufacturers guidelines, but also it allows 2 pilots that have never met before who may be from different crew bases and different cultures or backgrounds to fly together as a flight crew team on the same aircraft fully understanding what the other pilot is expected to be doing for the whole flight.
Different types of SOP’s are as follows:
A memory flow of arranging switches and levers in the correct position for a particular phase of flight. For example it is normal that the PM / PNF (Pilot monitoring or Pilot not flying) will complete the before start flow and then read the before start checklist which the PF (Pilot flying) will respond to.
A call or acknowledgement of an event. For example most EASA airlines have to acknowledge an automated callout of 1000ft which would be followed by PM / PNF stating whether they are stable or not for the subsequent landing.
A procedure that requires completing with certain criteria. For example in visible moisture below 10 degrees pilots will be required to taxi and take off with engine anti-ice systems on.
SOP’s can also be developed as time goes by to incorporate improvements based on experience, accidents, near misses or innovations from other manufacturers or operators to suit the needs of a particular organization.
SOP’s should not be designed too detailed and exhaustive that the pilot does not provide any form of cognition to the process and not be too relaxed where the crew have too many options to decide between.
If a pilot is not conforming to SOP’s he/she can be expected to be challenged by the other pilot.
However there may be an occasion where it is preferably or vital to ignore or not carry out an SOP. This would normally be in an emergency situation.
An example of this would be continuing to land the aircraft below the operating minima where the pilots had not become visual with the runway as they had an uncontrollable cabin fire.
Steve Forte got his introduction to flying by sitting next to his father in the family airplane. After seeing The High And The Mighty, he was fully bitten by the aviation bug, and took flying lessons while still in high school.
Steve "paid his dues" in civilian aviation, working various jobs and finally becoming a pilot, with Cochise airlines. One of his jobs was collecting the airsick bags at the end of every flight! After serving as an air ambulance pilot and flying Metroliners, he was finally hired by United Airlines in 1979.
At United, he started off as a Flight Engineer on the DC-8. Like everyone else hired during that time period, he was furloughed from United in 1981, and decided to go back to school, earning a full-ride scholarship to the University of Arizona to pursue his MBA. After recall at United, he became a flight instructor at the Denver Flight Training Center, and quickly rose up the management ranks, finally becoming Senior Vice President of Flight Operations.
Steve retired from United at age 50 and became President, CEO and COO of Naverus Corporation, a pioneer in performance-based navigation technologies for air traffic management. He later became Chief Operating Officer and Director of Operations for Virgin America Airlines.
After Virgin America was acquired by Alaska Airlines, Steve worked on writing his book, Takeoff, and producing a romantic comedy, Under The Eiffel Tower.
Steve is now Vice President of JetBlue University, and he still flies trips as Captain on JetBlue's A-320 airplanes.
What is Obstructive Sleep Apnea?
OSA affects a person’s upper airway in the area of the larynx (voice box) and the back of the throat. This area is normally held open to allow normal breathing by the surrounding muscles. When an individual is asleep, these muscles become slack, and the open area becomes smaller. In some individuals, this area becomes so small that breathing and resulting normal oxygenation of the blood is impaired. The person may actually choke. This causes some degree of arousal from normal sleep levels which the individual may or may not be aware of. These people do not get restorative sleep, and wake feeling tired.
OSA has significant safety implications because it can cause excessive daytime sleepiness, personality disturbances, cardiac dysrthythmias, myocardial infarction, stroke, sudden cardiac death, and hypertension, and cognitive impairment such as decreased memory, attention, planning, problem-solving and multi-tasking.
What is the background on the FAA’s actions on OSA?
The FAA’s has always used the special issuance medical certification process to certificate pilots with OSA. In November 2013, the FAA proposed guidance that would have required treatment for pilots with a body mass index (BMI) of 40 or more. It would have grounded those pilots until they successfully completed treatment, if required, and they obtained a Special Issuance medical certificate from the FAA. Key aviation industry stakeholders, as well as members of Congress, expressed concern about this enhanced screening. The FAA has now revised the guidance to address those concerns.
What is the new guidance?
An AME will not use BMI alone to assess whether the pilot applicant has OSA or as a basis for deferring the medical certificates (except in cases where the OSA risk is extreme). AME’s will screen for the risk for OSA using an integrated assessment of history, symptoms, and physical/clinical findings. OSA screening will only be done by the AME at the time of the physical examination using the American Academy of Sleep Medicine (AASM) guidance provided in the AME Guide. Pilots who are at risk for OSA will be issued a medical certificate and will then, shortly thereafter, receive a letter from the FAA’s Federal Air Surgeon requesting that an OSA evaluation be completed within 90 days. The evaluation may be done by any physician (including the AME), not just a sleep medicine specialist, following AASM guidelines. If the evaluating physician determines, using the AASM guidelines, that a laboratory sleep study or home study is warranted, it should be done at that time. The pilot may continue flying during the evaluation periodand initiation of treatment, if indicated. The airman will have 90 days (or longer under special circumstances) to accomplish this, as outlined in the Federal Air Surgeon’s letter. The FAA may consider an extension in some cases. Pilots diagnosed with OSA and undergoing treatment may send documentation of effective treatment to the FAA in order to have the FAA consider them for a special issuance medical certificate.
How is OSA treated?
Though several types of treatment are available depending on the severity of OSA, the most effective treatment involves the use of a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) or Automatic Positive Airway Pressure device that is worn while sleeping. In fact, there are currently 4,917 FAA-certificated pilots who are being treated for sleep apnea and are flying with a special issuance medical certificate.
When will the new guidance take affect?
The FAA plans to publish the new guidance in the FAA Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners on March 2, 2015.
What are the FAA’s current rules on OSA?
Untreated OSA always has been and will continue to be a generally disqualifying medical condition requiring a special issuance medical certificate. AMEs are advised by the FAA to be alert for OSA and other sleep-related disorders such as insomnia, restless legsyndrome,and neuromuscular or connective tissue disorders, because they could be signs of problems that could interfere with restorative sleep, which are needed for pilots to safely perform their duties.
Is the FAA changing the rules on OSA?
The FAA is not changing its medical standards related to OSA. The agency is revising the screening approach to help AMEs find undiagnosed and untreated OSA.
Have there been any accidents or incidents associated with OSA?
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that OSA was a contributing factor in the February13, 2008 Mesa Airlines (operated as go!) Flight 1002 incident, in which both the captain and first officer fell asleep during the flight. They flew 26 miles past their island destination into open ocean, and did not respond to air traffic controllers for more than 18 minutes. After normal communication was resumed, all three crewmembers and 40 passengers onboard arrived safely at their destination. The captain was found to have undiagnosed severe OSA. The NTSB has investigated accidents in all modes of passenger transportation involving operators with sleep disorders and believes OSA to be a significant safety risk. The NTSB database lists 34 accidents – 32 of which were fatal – where sleep apnea was mentioned in the pilot’s medical history, although sleep apnea was not listed as “causal” or “contributory” in those accidents. The database includes an additional 294 incidents where some type of sleep disorder was mentioned in the history.
Lorraine Morris started flying as a young child in the front seat with her father in a General Aviation airplane. She earned her Private Pilot certificate during the summer between high school and college, and continued to fly, working her way through college as a CFI.
Lorraine hired on with a major legacy airline, and rose to Line Check Airman (LCA) on the B777. In addition, she started flying warbirds with the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) and is now an Aircraft Commander on the EAA's Boeing B-17.
Lorraine resides on an airpark and owns three airplanes, as well as three projects she and her husband are restoring.
From You’ve probably heard the saying, “seniority is everything.” Well, in the airline piloting business, that’s absolutely correct. Every day you’re not on the roster is another day someone else gets above you.
Surely, seniority isn’t everything, right? Yes, it pretty much is. Let’s start with pay. The sooner you get hired, the sooner you can accrue longevity pay increases. Most airlines top out at 12- to 15-year pay, and you enjoy a raise on your hire date every year until you hit the top pay rate. Although the increases aren’t staggering, they are certainly meaningful, especially as a new hire. At the same time, however, most major airlines have some sort of retirement “B fund,” which is essentially a percentage of your salary that goes into a retirement fund. This is a significant benefit. If you make $100,000 in your third year, and the retirement B fund is 15 percent, the company pumps $15,000 into your retirement for that year. The higher your pay, the more money goes toward your retirement.
In the last five years or so, major airlines have been profitable, and most have some form of profit-sharing plan in place for employees. Typically, the profit-sharing payout is a percentage of your salary. Once again, seniority plays into this because the longer you’ve been on the property, the more you will take home in profit sharing.
And the sooner you get hired, the quicker you progress through the ranks to become a captain, where pay rates increase substantially. So, not only do you make 40 percent more in hourly pay, for example, the company will then be doling out that much more in your retirement B fund and in profit sharing. See where this is going? If you get hired at a major airline at age 25 instead of 35, you will accrue millions more in pay and benefits by the end of your career.
Then there’s the quality of life issue, and it’s a biggie. In the airline business, it’s all about people getting hired behind you, and those retiring or otherwise moving on who are ahead of you. If you get hired at the beginning of a hiring wave, you will rapidly move up the seniority ladder and get decent schedules within just a few months. Those hired at the tail end of a hiring wave will likely spend years toiling at the bottom of the seniority list, where the schedule can be brutal.
With seniority, you can transfer out of the company’s smaller airplanes and move on to widebody airplanes that pay more—and have easier schedules. Or you could use your seniority to become a captain on a smaller airplane and enjoy the big raise. Vacations are also based on seniority. Want to get the Fourth of July holiday off for a family vacation? Only the senior folks in their respective seats will get that. If you’re junior, expect to only secure vacation weeks in the winter—and only during weeks that don’t have a holiday in them. For pilots with families, being gone on weekends and holidays can be a real burden on your lifestyle. In the airline world, those woes can only be solved with seniority power.
So, does seniority mean everything? As you can see, it’s more than just important. Seniority drastically affects pay, retirement benefits, quality of life, and career advancement. In fact, if you’re given an opportunity to obtain an earlier hire date, jump on it any way you possibly can.
You’ve probably heard the saying, “seniority is everything.” Well, in the airline piloting business, that’s absolutely correct. Every day you’re not on the roster is another day someone else gets above you.
Surely, seniority isn’t everything, right? Yes, it pretty much is. Let’s start with pay. The sooner you get hired, the sooner you can accrue longevity pay increases. Most airlines top out at 12- to 15-year pay, and you enjoy a raise on your hire date every year until you hit the top pay rate. Although the increases aren’t staggering, they are certainly meaningful, especially as a new hire. At the same time, however, most major airlines have some sort of retirement “B fund,” which is essentially a percentage of your salary that goes into a retirement fund. This is a significant benefit. If you make $100,000 in your third year, and the retirement B fund is 15 percent, the company pumps $15,000 into your retirement for that year. The higher your pay, the more money goes toward your retirement.
In the last five years or so, major airlines have been profitable, and most have some form of profit-sharing plan in place for employees. Typically, the profit-sharing payout is a percentage of your salary. Once again, seniority plays into this because the longer you’ve been on the property, the more you will take home in profit sharing.
And the sooner you get hired, the quicker you progress through the ranks to become a captain, where pay rates increase substantially. So, not only do you make 40 percent more in hourly pay, for example, the company will then be doling out that much more in your retirement B fund and in profit sharing. See where this is going? If you get hired at a major airline at age 25 instead of 35, you will accrue millions more in pay and benefits by the end of your career.
Then there’s the quality of life issue, and it’s a biggie. In the airline business, it’s all about people getting hired behind you, and those retiring or otherwise moving on who are ahead of you. If you get hired at the beginning of a hiring wave, you will rapidly move up the seniority ladder and get decent schedules within just a few months. Those hired at the tail end of a hiring wave will likely spend years toiling at the bottom of the seniority list, where the schedule can be brutal.
With seniority, you can transfer out of the company’s smaller airplanes and move on to widebody airplanes that pay more—and have easier schedules. Or you could use your seniority to become a captain on a smaller airplane and enjoy the big raise. Vacations are also based on seniority. Want to get the Fourth of July holiday off for a family vacation? Only the senior folks in their respective seats will get that. If you’re junior, expect to only secure vacation weeks in the winter—and only during weeks that don’t have a holiday in them. For pilots with families, being gone on weekends and holidays can be a real burden on your lifestyle. In the airline world, those woes can only be solved with seniority power.
So, does seniority mean everything? As you can see, it’s more than just important. Seniority drastically affects pay, retirement benefits, quality of life, and career advancement. In fact, if you’re given an opportunity to obtain an earlier hire date, jump on it any way you possibly can.
ward your retirement.
In the last five years or so, major airlines have been profitable, and most have some form of profit-sharing plan in place for employees. Typically, the profit-sharing payout is a percentage of your salary. Once again, seniority plays into this because the longer you’ve been on the property, the more you will take home in profit sharing.
And the sooner you get hired, the quicker you progress through the ranks to become a captain, where pay rates increase substantially. So, not only do you make 40 percent more in hourly pay, for example, the company will then be doling out that much more in your retirement B fund and in profit sharing. See where this is going? If you get hired at a major airline at age 25 instead of 35, you will accrue millions more in pay and benefits by the end of your career.
Then there’s the quality of life issue, and it’s a biggie. In the airline business, it’s all about people getting hired behind you, and those retiring or otherwise moving on who are ahead of you. If you get hired at the beginning of a hiring wave, you will rapidly move up the seniority ladder and get decent schedules within just a few months. Those hired at the tail end of a hiring wave will likely spend years toiling at the bottom of the seniority list, where the schedule can be brutal.
With seniority, you can transfer out of the company’s smaller airplanes and move on to widebody airplanes that pay more—and have easier schedules. Or you could use your seniority to become a captain on a smaller airplane and enjoy the big raise. Vacations are also based on seniority. Want to get the Fourth of July holiday off for a family vacation? Only the senior folks in their respective seats will get that. If you’re junior, expect to only secure vacation weeks in the winter—and only during weeks that don’t have a holiday in them. For pilots with families, being gone on weekends and holidays can be a real burden on your lifestyle. In the airline world, those woes can only be solved with seniority power.
So, does seniority mean everything? As you can see, it’s more than just important. Seniority drastically affects pay, retirement benefits, quality of life, and career advancement. In fact, if you’re given an opportunity to obtain an earlier hire date, jump on it any way you possibly can.
Kendra is the Founder and Chair of Elevate Aviation and has been an air traffic controller for 19 years at the Edmonton ACC. Her early life did not start her down a path for success. In her adult life she took control and created her own success story. She has a passion for sharing her story and motivating others to live outside of their comfort zone in order to live a meaningful and fulfilling life.
She has raised thousands of dollars for charitable causes by producing and selling calendars, and climbed Mount Kilimanjaro to raise money for charity. She was honored as a Global Woman of Vision in 2016.
She founded Elevate Aviation to inspire men and women to pursue careers in aviation. Elevate pairs young people with mentors and career advisors in all fields of aviation
Kendra was recently selected as an Honorary RCAF Colonel.
Just this past week several aviator careers have been ruined by alcohol, so it may be time to review what the alcohol limits are for operating an airplane.
14 CFR § 91.17 states:
(a) No person may act or attempt to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft -
(1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage;
(2) While under the influence of alcohol;
(3) While using any drug that affects the person's faculties in any way contrary to safety; or
(4) While having an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater in a blood or breath specimen. Alcohol concentration means grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(b) Except in an emergency, no pilot of a civil aircraft may allow a person who appears to be intoxicated or who demonstrates by manner or physical indications that the individual is under the influence of drugs (except a medical patient under proper care) to be carried in that aircraft.
(c) A crewmember shall do the following:
(1) On request of a law enforcement officer, submit to a test to indicate the alcohol concentration in the blood or breath, when -
(i) The law enforcement officer is authorized under State or local law to conduct the test or to have the test conducted; and
(ii) The law enforcement officer is requesting submission to the test to investigate a suspected violation of State or local law governing the same or substantially similar conduct prohibited by paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(4) of this section.
(2) Whenever the FAA has a reasonable basis to believe that a person may have violated paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(4) of this section, on request of the FAA, that person must furnish to the FAA the results, or authorize any clinic, hospital, or doctor, or other person to release to the FAA, the results of each test taken within 4 hours after acting or attempting to act as a crewmember that indicates an alcohol concentration in the blood or breath specimen.
(d) Whenever the Administrator has a reasonable basis to believe that a person may have violated paragraph (a)(3) of this section, that person shall, upon request by the Administrator, furnish the Administrator, or authorize any clinic, hospital, doctor, or other person to release to the Administrator, the results of each test taken within 4 hours after acting or attempting to act as a crewmember that indicates the presence of any drugs in the body.
(e) Any test information obtained by the Administrator under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section may be evaluated in determining a person's qualifications for any airman certificate or possible violations of this chapter and may be used as evidence in any legal proceeding under section 602, 609, or 901 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
DURING HIS CHILDHOOD IN EL CENTRO, CALIFORNIA, SCOTT KARTVEDT (’90) WATCHED THE BLUE ANGELS NAVY FLIGHT DEMONSTRATION SQUADRON SWIRL AROUND THE SKY AS PART OF THEIR TRAINING EXERCISES. “I saw them practice while I was riding motorcycles,” says Kartvedt, now a commanding officer in the Navy’s Strike Fighter Squadron 101.
Twenty-five years later, it was Kartvedt who was in the pilot’s seat, flying a few inches away from a neighboring aircraft at 800 mph while taking a six-plane vertical delta formation. “Anytime someone asks what goes through my head when I’m up there, I always say I’m just there in the moment,” explains Kartvedt, now the commanding officer of the Navy's first F-35 squadron, Strike Fighter Squadron ONE ZERO ONE (VFA-101). “There are times when you break away and you have that moment to fly, so you have that chance to take it all in or take in the crowd. It’s a rush!”
Among more than 90,000 Pepperdine alumni, he is the only naval officer selected as a member of the Blue Angels. Yet without Pepperdine, Kartvedt would have never even considered enlisting in the military. Passing by Chancellor Emeritus Charlie Runnels’ office one afternoon in 1990, “I saw a naval aviation poster, which caught my eye,” he recalls. “I knocked on the door, started a conversation, and struck up a friendship from that point on. We talked a lot about naval aviation and the challenges of training, but also the joys of service.” Runnels later wrote a letter of recommendation for Kartvedt’s Navy application, which propelled his decades-long career in the military.
Since then, Kartvedt has become a decorated naval commander, who has participated in 1996 Taiwanese Contingency Operations, Operations Southern Watch, and Iraqi Freedom; during Operation Enduring Freedom he commanded an F/A-18 squadron during two deployments supporting ground forces in Afghanistan. In 2010 Kartvedt assumed duties at the Pentagon as the Navy’s Joint Strike Fighter requirements officer responsible for establishing the Navy’s first stealth fighter and for training pilots and maintainers on how to operate the F-35.
Ashore, Kartvedt served with Marine Strike Fighter Squadron 101 as an F/A-18 flight instructor and landing signal officer. He has also held a post as a requirements officer of the Naval Aviation Joint Strike Fighter, where he assisted the director of air warfare in the development, programming, and budgeting of war-fighting requirements for the F-35C Strike Fighter.
Throughout his accomplished career, Kartvedt counts his wife Lisa (’90) as his most ardent supporter and someone who has enabled the family’s smooth transition throughout the 13 moves the Kartvedts have made since 2004. “We have always decided that we would move together,” he explains. “But the sweetest moment of any military career is the homecoming and homecoming embrace, because you spend six months thinking about it and when you finally reach that moment, it’s sweeter than anything you can imagine.”
An in-flight cabin fire is one of the most serious emergencies a crew can encounter. In my blog (Open Ocean, No Comm, On Fire) several years ago I related my experience with an in-flight fire while over the ocean out of radio contact with Air Traffic Control.
In 1998, as the result of an airline accident, the FAA mandated installation of smoke goggles on air carrier aircraft.
Until fairly recently, many airline aircraft provided separate smoke goggles, stored near the crew oxygen masks. This presented a conundrum: which should be donned first, the goggles or the mask? Recently, more and more operators are upgrading their equipment to smoke goggles integral to the oxygen masks.
Obviously, oxygen masks are necessary in the event of a depressurization. But in the event of smoke or fire, goggles are essential, to allow the crew to continue to see the instruments, and to prevent exposure to toxic gasses.
In many cases of structural aircraft fires, cyanide is present in the smoke. this cyanide can be absorbed through the eyes, so it is essential to protect the eyes.
Another solution to allow crews to see the instruments is the Emergency Vision Assurance System (EVAS ).
Lisa Marranzino was a therapist in Denver when she realized something was missing in her life. It might have been mid-life crisis. Whatever it was, she decided to explore the world and find what made people happy, both for herself and her patients.
That started a five-year odyssey in which she traveled to over 40 countries, spoke to scores of strangers in intimate conversations, and tried to find a common theme to what brings people happiness in all cultures.
She documented her conversations in her book, Happiness On The Blue Dot.
In this podcast, Lisa shares her experiences as a world traveler, and offers suggestions for interacting with strangers from around the world.
Operations Specifications (OPSPECS) are the specifications that the FAA assigns to airlines for such things as authorized routes, types of equipment, VFR and IFR operations, and alternate requirements.
OPS Spec C055 discusses the requirement for alternate airports.
From https://blog.airployment.com/common-121-takeoff-minimums-and-takeoff-alternate-questions/:
One area that is sometimes difficult for new Part 121 pilots to comprehend is the exclusivity of takeoff minimums from landing minimums. Try to picture each as completely separate from the other. Just because a particular airport is below landing minimums doesn’t (necessarily) mean you can’t depart. Instead, first attempt to consider the takeoff minimums by themselves. If the weather, airport equipment, aircraft capabilities, and FARs/Ops Specs will permit such a takeoff, nothing prevents you from departing. Only after you’ve examined the feasibility of a takeoff should you look at the landing minimums.
What if the airport is below landing mins? Then you’re required to have a takeoff alternate as outlined in 14 CFR 121.617. The exact weather mins for the takeoff alternate will be specified in the Ops Specs. In nearly all cases, your company Ops Specs will state the engine-inop, still-air distance in nautical miles (NMs); thus giving you an idea of the acceptable radius for an appropriate alternate.
121.617b says the takeoff alternate has to meet the alternate minimums in the Ops Specs. Paragraph C55 is the create your own minimums paragraph based on the available approaches. Pretty much for one approach add 400 and 1 to the mins and for 2 approaches, 200 and a half to the higher minimuns. The approaches have to be to different runways unless you're ETOPS, then they have to be to separate runways. If you're good for CAT III and the airport has dual CAT III runways you can get your alternate minimums down to 200/1800RVR. If it was down to that, I'd see about having a second alternate added to the release.
United Airlines Flight 232 was a regularly scheduled United Airlines flight from Denver to Chicago, continuing to Philadelphia. On July 19, 1989, the DC-10 (registered as N1819U) serving the flight crash-landed at Sioux City, Iowa, after suffering a catastrophic failure of its tail-mounted engine, which led to the loss of many flight controls. At the time, the aircraft was en route from Stapleton International Airport to O'Hare International Airport. Of the 296 passengers and crew on board, 111 died in the accident and 185 survived, making the crash the fifth-deadliest involving the DC-10, behind Turkish Airlines Flight 981, American Airlines Flight 191, Air New Zealand Flight 901, and UTA Flight 772. Despite the deaths, the accident is considered a prime example of successful crew resource management because of the large number of survivors and the manner in which the flight crew handled the emergency and landed the airplane without conventional control.
The airplane, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 (registration N1819U), was delivered in 1973 and had been owned by United Airlines since then. Before departure on the flight from Denver on July 19, 1989, the airplane had been operated for a total of 43,401 hours and 16,997 cycles (a takeoff and subsequent landing is considered an aircraft cycle). The airplane was powered by CF6-6D high-bypass-ratio turbofan engines produced by General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE).
Captain Alfred Clair Haynes, 57, was hired by United Airlines in 1956. He had 29,967 hours of total flight time with United Airlines, of which 7,190 were in the DC-10.
First Officer William Roy Records, 48, was hired by National Airlines in 1969. He subsequently worked for Pan American World Airways. He estimated that he had approximately 20,000 hours of total flight time. He had 665 hours as a DC-10 first officer.
Second Officer Dudley Joseph Dvorak, 51, was hired by United Airlines in 1986. He estimated that he had approximately 15,000 hours of total flying time. He had 1,900 hours as a second officer in the Boeing 727 and 33 hours as a second officer in the DC-10.
Training Check Airman Captain Dennis Edward Fitch, 46, was hired by United Airlines in 1968. He estimated that, prior to working for United, he had accrued at least 1,400 hours of flight time with the Air National Guard, with a total flight time of approximately 23,000 hours. His total DC-10 time with United was 3,079 hours, of which 2,000 hours were accrued as a second officer, 1,000 hours as a first officer, and 79 hours as a captain. He had learned of the crash of Japan Airlines Flight 123, caused by a catastrophic loss of hydraulic control, and had wondered if it was possible to control an aircraft using throttles only. He had practiced under similar conditions on a simulator.
Flight 232 took off at 14:09 CDT from Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado, bound for O'Hare International Airport in Chicago with continuing service to Philadelphia International Airport.
At 15:16, while the plane was in a shallow right turn at 37,000 feet, the fan disk of its tail-mounted General Electric CF6-6 engine explosively disintegrated. Debris penetrated the tail in numerous places, including the horizontal stabilizer, puncturing the lines of all three hydraulic systems.
The pilots felt a jolt, and the autopilot disengaged. As Records took hold of his control column, Haynes focused on the tail engine, whose instruments indicated it was malfunctioning; he found its throttle and fuel supply controls jammed. At Dvorak's suggestion, a valve cutting fuel to the tail engine was shut off. This part of the emergency took 14 seconds.
Meanwhile, Records found that the plane did not respond to his control column. Even with the control column turned all the way to the left, commanding maximum left aileron, and pulled all the way back, commanding maximum up elevator – inputs that would never be used together in normal flight – the aircraft was banking to the right with the nose dropping. Haynes attempted to level the aircraft with his own control column, then both Haynes and Records tried using their control columns together, but the aircraft still did not respond. Afraid the aircraft would roll into a completely inverted position (an unrecoverable situation), the crew reduced the left wing-mounted engine to idle and applied maximum power to the right engine. This caused the airplane to slowly level out.
The various gauges for all three hydraulic systems were registering zero. The three hydraulic systems were separate, so that failure of any one of them would leave the crew with full control, but lines for all three systems shared the same narrow passage through the tail where the engine debris had penetrated, and thus control surfaces were inoperative. The crew contacted United maintenance personnel via radio, but were told that, as a total loss of hydraulics on the DC-10 was considered "virtually impossible", there were no established procedures for such an event.
The plane was tending to pull right, and slowly oscillated vertically in a phugoid cycle – characteristic of planes in which control surface command is lost. With each iteration of the cycle, the aircraft lost approximately 1,500 feet (460 m) of altitude. On learning that Fitch, an experienced United Airlines captain and DC-10 flight instructor, was among the passengers, the crew called him into the cockpit for assistance.
Haynes asked Fitch to observe the ailerons through the passenger cabin windows to see if control inputs were having any effect. Fitch reported back that the ailerons were not moving at all. Nonetheless, the crew continued to manipulate their control columns for the remainder of the flight, hoping for at least some effect. Haynes then asked Fitch to take over control of the throttles so that Haynes could concentrate on his control column. With one throttle in each hand, Fitch was able to mitigate the phugoid cycle and make rough steering adjustments.
As the crew began to prepare for arrival at Sioux City, they questioned whether they should deploy the landing gear or belly-land the aircraft with the gear retracted. They decided that having the landing gear down would provide some shock absorption on impact.The complete hydraulic failure left the landing gear lowering mechanism inoperative. Two options were available to the flight crew. The DC-10 is designed so that if hydraulic pressure to the landing gear is lost, the gear will fall down slightly and rest on the landing gear doors. Placing the regular landing gear handle in the down position will unlock the doors mechanically, and the doors and landing gear will then fall down into place and lock due to gravity. An alternative system is also available using a lever in the cockpit floor to cause the landing gear to fall into position. This lever has the added benefit of unlocking the outboard ailerons, which are not used in high-speed flight and are locked in a neutral position. The crew hoped that there might be some trapped hydraulic fluid in the outboard ailerons and that they might regain some use of flight controls by unlocking them. They elected to extend the gear with the alternative system. Although the gear deployed successfully, there was no change in the controllability of the aircraft.
Landing was originally planned on the 9,000-foot (2,700 m) Runway 31. Difficulties in controlling the aircraft made lining up almost impossible. While dumping some of the excess fuel, the plane executed a series of mostly right-hand turns (it was easier to turn the plane in this direction) with the intention of lining up with Runway 31. When they came out they were instead lined up with the shorter (6,888 ft) and closed Runway 22, and had little capacity to maneuver. Fire trucks had been placed on Runway 22, anticipating a landing on nearby Runway 31, so all the vehicles were quickly moved out of the way before the plane touched down. Runway 22 had been permanently closed a year earlier.
ATC also advised that I-29 ran North and South just East of the airport which they could land on if they did not think they could make the runway. The pilot opted to try for the runway instead.
The plane landed askew, causing the explosion and fire seen in this still from local news station video.
Fitch continued to control the aircraft's descent by adjusting engine thrust. With the loss of all hydraulics, the flaps could not be extended and since flaps control both the minimum required forward speed and sink rate, the crew were unable to control both airspeed and sink rate. On final descent, the aircraft was going 220 knots and sinking at 1,850 feet per minute (approximately 407 km/h forward and 34 km/h downward speed), while a safe landing would require 140 knots and 300 feet per minute (approximately 260 km/h and 5 km/h respectively). Fitch needed a seat for landing; Dvorak offered up his own, as it could be moved to a position behind the throttles. Dvorak sat in the cockpit's jump seat for landing. Fitch noticed the high sink rate and that the plane started to yaw right again, and pushed the throttles to full power in an attempt to mitigate the high sink rate and level the plane.
There was not enough time for the flight crew to react. The tip of the right wing hit the runway first, spilling fuel, which ignited immediately. The tail section broke off from the force of the impact, and the rest of the aircraft bounced several times, shedding the landing gear and engine nacelles and breaking the fuselage into several main pieces. On the final impact, the right wing was shorn off and the main part of the aircraft skidded sideways, rolled over onto its back, and slid to a stop upside-down in a corn field to the right of Runway 22. Witnesses reported that the aircraft "cartwheeled" end-over-end, but the investigation did not confirm this. The reports were due to misinterpretation of the video of the crash that showed the flaming right wing tumbling end-over-end and the intact left wing, still attached to the fuselage, rolling up and over as the fuselage flipped over.
Tiffany Behr comes from a long line of military aviators, and was introduced to flying at an early age when she want flying with her father.
She attended Kansas University and then entered Air Force Undergraduate Pilot training at Laughlin Air Force Base in Del Rio, Texas. Her initial flying assignment was to C-130s, where she deployed on combat missions in Afghanistan.
Her next flying assignment was in the RC-135, OC-135 and WC-135. Following that, she was selected to fly Presidential Support missions in the 89th Military Airlift Squadron.
Next, she was selected to be a speech-writer for high-ranking officers in the Middle East.
After Tiffany left active duty she was hired by a major legacy airline, where she currently flies B737 NG aircraft.
A tail strike can occur during either takeoff or landing. Many air carrier aircraft have tail skids to absorb energy from a tailstrike. On some aircraft, the tail skid is a small bump on the aft underside of the airplane, while on others it is a retractable skid that extends and retracts with the landing gear.
Most tail strikes are the result of pilot error, and in general, landing tail strikes cause more damage than takeoff tail strikes.
In 1978, Japan Airlines flight 115 experienced a tail strike during landing that caused damage to the aft pressure bulkhead. The aircraft was repaired (although the repair was faulty) and returned to service. Seven years later, the aircraft, operating as Japan Airlines Flight 123, crashed as a result of the failure of the improperly-repaired pressure bulkhead.
This Boeing document is an excellent analysis of tailstrikes. A portion of the document is reproduced below:
Takeoff Risk Factors
Any one of these four takeoff risk factors may precede a tail strike:
MISTRIMMED STABILIZER
A mistrimmed stabilizer occurring during takeoff is not common but is an experience shared at least once by almost every flight crew. It usually results from using erroneous data, the wrong weights, or an incorrect center of gravity (CG). Sometimes the information presented to the flight crew is accurate, but it is entered incorrectly either to the flight management system (FMS) or to the stabilizer itself. In any case, the stabilizer is set in the wrong position. The flight crew can become aware of the error and correct the condition by challenging the reasonableness of the load sheet numbers. A flight crew that has made a few takeoffs in a given weight range knows roughly where the CG usually resides and approximately where the trim should be set. Boeing suggests testing the load sheet numbers against past experience to be sure that the numbers are reasonable.
A stabilizer mistrimmed nosedown can present several problems, but tail strike usually is not one of them. However, a stabilizer mistrimmed noseup can place the tail at risk. This is because the yoke requires less pull force to initiate airplane rotation during takeoff, and the pilot flying (PF) may be surprised at how rapidly the nose comes up. With the Boeing-recommended rotation rate between 2.0 and 3.0 degrees per second (dps), depending on the model, and a normal liftoff attitude, liftoff usually occurs about four seconds after the nose starts to rise. (These figures are fairly standard for all commercial airplanes; exact values are contained in the operations and/or flight-crew training manuals for each model.) However, with the stabilizer mistrimmed noseup, the airplane can rotate 5 dps or more. With the nose rising very rapidly, the airplane does not have enough time to change its flight path before exceeding the critical attitude. Tail strike can then occur within two or three seconds of the time rotation is initiated.
If the stabilizer is substantially mistrimmed noseup, the airplane may even try to fly from the runway without control input from the PF. Before reaching Vr, and possibly as early as approaching V1, the nose begins to ride light on the runway. Two or three light bounces may occur before the nose suddenly goes into the air. A faster-than-normal rotation usually follows and, when the airplane passes through the normal liftoff attitude, it lacks sufficient speed to fly and so stays on the runway. Unless the PF actively intercedes, the nose keeps coming up until the tail strike occurs, either immediately before or after liftoff.
ROTATION AT IMPROPER SPEED
This situation can result in a tail strike and is usually caused by one of two reasons: rotation is begun early because of some unusual situation, or the airplane is rotated at a Vr that has been computed incorrectly and is too low for the weight and flap setting.
An example of an unusual situation discovered during the DPD examination was a twinjet going out at close to the maximum allowable weight. In order to make second segment climb, the crew had selected a lower-than-usual flap setting. The lower flap setting generates V speeds somewhat higher than normal and reduces tail clearance during rotation. In addition, the example situation was a runway length-limited takeoff. The PF began to lighten the nose as the airplane approached V1, which is an understandable impulse when ground speed is high and the end of the runway is near. The nose came off the runway at V1 and, with a rather aggressive rotation, the tail brushed the runway just after the airplane became airborne.
An error in Vr speed recently resulted in a trijet tail strike. The load sheet numbers were accurate, but somehow the takeoff weight was entered into the FMS 100,000 lb lower than it should have been. The resulting Vr was 12 knots indicated air speed (kias) slow. When the airplane passed through a nominal 8-deg liftoff attitude, a lack of sufficient speed prevented takeoff. Rotation was allowed to continue, with takeoff and tail strike occurring at about 11 deg. Verification that the load sheet numbers were correctly entered may have prevented this incident.
EXCESSIVE ROTATION RATE
Flight crews operating an airplane model that is new to them, especially when transitioning from unpowered flight controls to ones with hydraulic assistance, are most vulnerable to using excessive rotation rate. The amount of control input required to achieve the proper rotation rate varies from one model to another. When transitioning to a new model, flight crews may not consciously realize that it will not respond to pitch input in exactly the same way.
As simulators reproduce airplane responses with remarkable fidelity, simulator training can help flight crews learn the appropriate response. A concentrated period of takeoff practice allows students to develop a sure sense of how the new airplane feels and responds to pitch inputs. On some models, this is particularly important when the CG is loaded toward its aft limits, because an airplane in this condition is more sensitive in pitch, especially during takeoff. A normal amount of noseup elevator in an aft CG condition is likely to cause the nose to lift off the runway more rapidly and put the tail at risk.
IMPROPER USE OF THE FLIGHT DIRECTOR
As shown in figure 1, the flight director (FD) is designed to provide accurate pitch guidance only after the airplane is airborne, nominally passing through 35 ft (10.7 m). With the proper rotation rate, the airplane reaches 35 ft with the desired pitch attitude of about 15 deg and a speed of V2 + 10 (V2 + 15 on some models). However, an aggressive rotation into the pitch bar at takeoff is not appropriate and may rotate the tail onto the ground.
Landing Risk Factors
Any one of these four landing risk factors may precede a tail strike:
A tail strike on landing tends to cause more serious damage than the same event during takeoff and is more expensive and time consuming to repair. In the worst case, the tail can strike the runway before the landing gear touches down, thus absorbing large amounts of energy for which it is not designed. The aft pressure bulkhead is often damaged as a result.
UNSTABILIZED APPROACH
An unstabilized approach appears in one form or another in virtually every landing tail strike event. When an airplane turns on to final approach with excessive airspeed, excessive altitude, or both, the situation may not be under the control of the flight crew. The most common cause of this scenario is the sequencing of traffic in the terminal area as determined by air traffic control.
Digital flight recorder data show that flight crews who continue through an unstabilized condition below 500 ft will likely never get the approach stabilized. When the airplane arrives in the flare, it invariably has either excessive or insufficient airspeed, and quite often is also long on the runway. The result is a tendency toward large power and pitch corrections in the flare, often culminating in a vigorous noseup pull at touchdown and tail strike shortly thereafter. If the nose is coming up rapidly when touchdown occurs and the ground spoilers deploy, the spoilers themselves add an additional noseup pitching force. Also, if the airplane is slow, pulling up the nose in the flare does not materially reduce the sink rate and in fact may increase it. A firm touchdown on the main gear is often preferable to a soft touchdown with the nose rising rapidly.
HOLDING OFF IN THE FLARE
The second most common cause of a landing tail strike is a long flare to a drop-in touchdown, a condition often precipitated by a desire to achieve an extremely smooth landing. A very soft touchdown is not essential, nor even desired, particularly if the runway is wet.
Trimming the stabilizer in the flare may contribute to a tail strike. The PF may easily lose the feel of the elevator while the trim is running; too much trim can raise the nose, even when this reaction is not desired. The pitchup can cause a balloon, followed either by dropping in or pitching over and landing flat. Flight crews should trim the airplane in the approach, but not in the flare itself, and avoid "squeakers," as they waste runway and may predispose the airplane to a tail strike.
MISHANDLING OF CROSSWINDS
A crosswind approach and landing contains many elements that may increase the risk of tail strike, particularly in the presence of gusty conditions. Wind directions near 90 deg to the runway heading are often strong at pattern altitude, and with little headwind component, the airplane flies the final approach with a rapid rate of closure on the runway. To stay on the glidepath at that high groundspeed, descent rates of 700 to 900 ft (214 to 274 m) per minute may be required. Engine power is likely to be well back, approaching idle in some cases, to avoid accelerating the airplane. If the airplane is placed in a forward slip attitude to compensate for the wind effects, this cross-control maneuver reduces lift, increases drag, and may increase the rate of descent. If the airplane then descends into a turbulent surface layer, particularly if the wind is shifting toward the tail, the stage is set for tail strike.
The combined effects of high closure rate, shifting winds with the potential for a quartering tail wind, the sudden drop in wind velocity commonly found below 100 ft (31 m), and turbulence can make the timing of the flare very difficult. The PF can best handle the situation by exercising active control of the sink rate and making sure that additional thrust is available if needed. Flight crews should clearly understand the criteria for initiating a go-around and plan to use this time-honored avoidance maneuver when needed.
OVER-ROTATION DURING GO-AROUND
Go-arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as during flare or after a bounce, are a common cause of tail strike. When the go-around mode is initiated, the FD immediately commands a go-around pitch attitude. If the PF abruptly rotates into the command bars, tail strike can occur before a change to the flight path is possible. Both pitch attitude and thrust are required for go-around, so if the engines are just spooling up when the PF vigorously pulls the nose up, the thrust may not yet be adequate to support the effort. The nose comes up, and the tail goes down. A contributing factor may be a strong desire of the flight crew to avoid wheel contact after initiating a late go-around, when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, the concern is not warranted because a brief contact with the tires during a late go-around does not produce adverse consequences. Airframe manufacturers have executed literally hundreds of late go-arounds during autoland certification programs with dozens of runway contacts, and no problem has ever resulted. The airplane simply flies away from the touchdown.